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 Problem: Estimating the risk of terrorism to a 
system depends upon the range of attack 
scenarios available to the adversary    . 
Approach: Use logic gate trees (LGTs) to        
represent subject matter expert (SME) 
knowledge in a model that provides the basis for         
the risk analysis. The LGTs are developed using 
the Logic Evolved Decision (LED) methodology.
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P t ti O tliresen a on u ne
 Background
 Structure of a Terrorist Attack 
 LED Models for the Air Transportation      
System (ATS)
 Scenario Groupings, Concept of    
Operations (CONOPS), and Technology 
Insertions 
 The Role of Expert Elicitation
 Conclusions
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Background
4
Risk-based Prioritization of
NASA Aviation Security Research
 NASA Goal:
– Use a top-down analysis approach to rank order security 
technology investments 
 Objective:
Decision support tool to prioritize aviation security–        
research
– Based upon an air transportation system (ATS) risk 
assessment
 Technical Challenges:
– Pioneering development effort
– Security assessments for the entire ATS
– Extensive integration of subject matter experts
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Approach to Aviation Security
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Increase effectiveness 
of aviation information 
screening
Electronic Nose
Assessing Air Transportation System Risk    
Risk Assessment Approach 
to Aviation Security
4 ATS Divided into Three Sub-
systems
4 Aircraft Further Decomposed into 
Federal Aviation Regulation Parts
 Aircraft
– Part 121 Passenger/Cargo
– Part 121 All Cargo
P t 135– ar  
– Part 91
 Airport
 Airspace
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Structure of a Terrorist Attack
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An Attack Scenario Is A Process
Description of the process an    
adversary carries out 
operations against a target
Target
Selection Planning Logistics Assault
Target
Response
Attacker For the ATS a very large number of scenarios are 
possible
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LED Models for the ATS
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Possible Scenarios Are Generated 
Using LGTs with LED
D l P ibilit T1. eve op a oss y ree
 Composed of elements of a process
 Logical operators (i e and / or) connect elements  . .,    
 Deduction facilitates capturing a large set of 
possible scenarios
2. Solve the Possibility Tree
 Generate scenarios from logically linked elements
 Prune the tree to develop a spanning set of 
scenarios
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Logic Gate Tree for Attacks against the ATS
Airports
Aircraft
Airspace
(passenger and cargo) aircraft.
LGT ll f i ts a ow or conven en  
modularization of the 
attack space
Individual Sub Trees Follows  
Logical Decomposition
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Possibility Tree for Part 121 PC Attack Scenarios
Attack Types
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The Possibility-Tree Solution Gives a 
Comprehensive Set of Attack Scenarios    
Attack on the US aviation system. Attack is against the commercial aviation 
s stem The targeted s stem is classified as a Part 121 air carrier operation They .   y        -  .  
air-carrier operation handles passenger and cargo traffic. The attack targets the 
aircraft. The attack is on the airframe. The attack originates external to the aircraft. 
The attack involves weaponry. The weapon used is a man-portable missile. The 
attacker acquires the weapon system. The attacker transports the missile system 
to the attack site. The attacker acquires the target. The attacker fires the missile. 
The missile flies to the target. The missile warhead detonates. The attacker group 
consists of outsiders only   .
Attack scenarios appear in 
natural language form for 
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use with SMEs
S i G i CONOPS dcenar o roup ngs, , an  
Technology Insertions
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Summary Attack Scenarios in Spanning 
Type of Attack
Number of 
Scenarios Example
Set for Part 121 PC Aircraft
Attack on crew or passengers 4 Dispersion of chemical agent in passenger 
compartment
Attack on airframe 20 Missile attack with man-portable system
Attack on critical on-board systems 24 Jamming or spoofing of navigational aids
Use of aircraft as an enabling system for 
weapons-of-mass-destruction attack
4 Variations of 9/11 World Trade Center 
attack 
Screening process for developing a workable sub-set of 
scenarios that are representative of a larger class of attacks.
Similar spanning sets were 
developed for airports and the air
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space in consultation with SMEs
A Scenario / Technology Crosswalk
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Concept of Operations for Technologies
 Technology CONOPS
– CONOPS processes converted into LED trees
– Define technology insertion points
(passenger and cargo) aircraft.
– Operations are fine-tuned
– Gaps and functional requirements result
– Define how the overall system functions
– Discover technology interactions, gaps, and system impacts
– Identify responsibilities and information transfers between 
system components
 CONOPS based system requirements for 
technologies
– Define and optimize system operating parameters
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The Role of Expert Elicitation
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Many Different Types of SMEs 
Participated in the Analysis   
 National Institute of Aerospace (NIA)
A i ti S t E t C lt t– v a on ys em xper  onsu an s
 Aviation Operations
– Pilots
Airport Managers–  
– Air Traffic Controllers
 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)
– Electromagnetic Effects Expertise
 NASA Aviation Security Research Projects
– Research Project Input to Analysis
 Volpe Center Department of Transportation (Volpe)     
– Cost/Benefit Studies
 Experts on terrorism from various agencies
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SME Roles 
 Definition of system for analysis
 Development of attack scenario possibility 
trees
 Selection of spanning sets
 Revision of trees and sets based upon 
initial risk assessment
 Development of CONOPS and 
identification of technology insertion points
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Conclusions
 To be meaningful, terrorist risk analyses must have a 
well-defined set of attack scenarios
Logic gate trees provide a structured approach to scenario–          
development
– The possibility tree contains a very large set of scenarios
– Spanning sets can be developed for different purposes       
 An LGT model can be extended to incorporate 
CONOPS and to help define technology 
requirements
 Terrorist risk analysis is highly dependent on SME 
knowledge
– Possibility trees are an efficient way to integrate large 
amounts of expert knowledge
– A tree can be easily updated to reflect new information or 
modified as a result of SME interactions
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Backup
Detailed Risk Assessment 
Process for Prioritizing NASA 
Research in Aviation Security
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Aviation Security Risk Assessment 7 Step Development Process
Technology CONOPS Development Integral Part of Process
Step 1:
Brainstorm Attack Scenario Possibilities
Step 2:
Develop Attack Scenarios
Step 3:
Develop Risk Models for
Steps 1-4:
Determine
Accident
Scenario   
Defender and Attacker
Step 4:
Identify Attack Scenario Baseline Risk
Baseline Risk
Step 5:
Apply P/MMs (Technologies) to Scenarios
Step 6:
Steps 5-7:
Prioritize
Preventive/  
Evaluate Ideal Risk Reduction Potential
Step 7:
Prioritize Final Risk Reduction
Mitigating
Measures
(P/MMs)
Risk Reduction
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Capability Using Additional AttributesCapability
Step 1: Think Like a Terrorist Step 2: Develop Attack Scenarios
ATS Risk Assessment Development Process
Structure of a Terrorist-Attack Scenario
    
Target
Selection Planning Logistics Assault
Target
Response
Attacker
Dependence of Scenario Risk on Attacker Type 
Step 4: Identify Attack Scenario Baseline RiskStep 3: Develop Risk Modelsfor Defender and Attacker
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The Possibility Tree Solution Gives a 
Comprehensive Set of Attack Scenarios
Step 2 Details:
Attack Scenario Development
Using LED Approach
Attack on the US aviation system. Attack is against the commercial aviation system. The targeted system 
is classified as a Part 121 air-carrier operation. The air-carrier operation handles passenger and cargo 
traffic. The attack targets the aircraft. The attack is on the airframe. The attack originates external to the 
aircraft. The attack involves weaponry. The weapon used is a man-portable missile. The attacker acquires 
the weapon system. The attacker transports the missile system to the attack site. The attacker acquires 
the target. The attacker fires the missile. The missile flies to the target. The missile warhead detonates. 
The attacker group consists of outsiders only.
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Step 3 Details: Inferential Risk Model Development
Security RISK f S i Att k t t f INTENT … o  a cenar o or ac  mus  accoun  or 
(Likelihood of Choosing) 9 (Likelihood of Success given Choice) 9 (Consequence) = RISK
 Recognizes Factors Contributing to Risk
 Logical Operators (i.e., and / or) Connect Factors
 In lieu of Reasonable Probabilities, Risk is Inferred by Chaining Rule 
Bases According to Model Logic Using:     
Linguistic Variables - Approximate Reasoning - Fuzzy Membership Sets
(Susceptibility) 9 (Vulnerability) 9 (Consequence) = RISK
(Likelihood of Choosing)
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(Consequence) (Likelihood of Success given Choice)
Aviation Security Research Portfolio Prioritization
Step 6: Prioritize Ideal Risk Reduction Potential
Prioritizing Aviation Security Research
Step 5: Map Technologies to Scenarios
      
Identify a spanning set of possible scenarios
Map the PM suites onto the possible scenario set 
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End State Achieved:
Scenarios 
Addressed
Technologies Evaluated for Three Categories
Tech 1
Tech 2
…
Tech N
  
-Technologies Prioritized Based Upon a 
Comprehensive Risk Assessment.
Results In:
 Stand-Alone
 Integrated
 Enhanced Integration
28
1) Technologies Prioritized Based on Risk 
Reduction Potential for Three Levels of Integration
2) Risk Assessment for ATS
Step 7: Prioritize Final Risk Reduction Capability
Additional Prioritization Attributes:
Final Risk 
Reduction
C bilit
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Total Impact on Risk Reduction Capital
 Consequence
 Benefit
 Technical Risk
 Technology development
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Transition Risk 
Reduction Level
Hand-off 
to 
Implementation
 
 Dependencies
 Complexity
 Implementation Risk
 Certification
 Cultural issues
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Risk 2
Ri k R d ti
Conceptual Level
 
 User acceptance
 Technology Readiness Level
 Cost
 Funding available for technology development
 Schedule n t a  xpecte
Risk Reduction
s  e uc on
Low Med High
 Time available for technology development
 National Needs Based Time Frame for Technology 
Development
 Technology Impact on Throughput Volume
 Delay introduced by technology insertion
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 Technology impact on demand
 Technology impact on capacity
